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1 Modal Set Theory and Traditional Modal Metaphysics 
Set theory is the study of sets using the tools of contemporary mathematical logic. Modal set theory 
draws in particular upon contemporary modal logic, the logic of necessity and possibility. One 
simple and obvious motivation for modal set theory is the fact that, from a realist perspective that 
takes the existence of sets seriously, sets have philosophically interesting modal properties. For 
instance, perhaps the most notable and distinctive property of sets is their extensionality: sets 𝑎 
and 𝑏 are identical if they have exactly the same members; formally, where we take variables from 
the lower end of the alphabet to range over sets: 
Ext ∀𝑎∀𝑏(∀𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝑎 ↔ 𝑥 ∈ 𝑏) → 𝑎 = 𝑏). 
Intuitively, however, extensionality is not a contingent matter, a mere matter of happenstance. 
Rather, there simply couldn’t have been distinct sets that shared all their members; there is no such 
possible world. That is, at a minimum, we want to be able to express that extensionality is a 
necessary truth: □Ext □∀𝑎∀𝑏(∀𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝑎 ↔ 𝑥 ∈ 𝑏) → 𝑎 = 𝑏). 
 Clearly, however, there is much more than this to the modal connection between sets and their 
members. For note that, for all □Ext tells us, one and the same set 𝑎 could have vastly different 
members from one world to the next, so long as it remains the case that, in each world, no other 
set has exactly the same members as 𝑎 in that world. Intuitively, however, the intimate connection 
between a set and its members is maintained across worlds; if a set has Angela Merkel, say, as a 
member, it could not possibly have failed to have her as a member. Sets, that is to say, have their 
members essentially; if 𝑥 is a member of 𝑎, then it is a member of 𝑎 in every world in which 𝑎 
 
* The author is grateful to Øystein Linnebo, Neil Barton, and John Wigglesworth for helpful and illuminating 
comments on earlier drafts of this entry. 
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exists, i.e., in every world in which something is identical to 𝑎; formally, letting 𝐸!t abbreviate ∃𝑦 𝑦 = 𝑡, for terms 𝑡: 
E∈ □∀𝑎∀𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝑎 → □(𝐸!𝑎 → 𝑥 ∈ 𝑎)), 
Likewise, non-membership; a set cannot “add” new members in one world that it lacks in another: 
E∉ □∀𝑎∀𝑥(𝑥 ∉ 𝑎 → □(𝐸!𝑎 → 𝑥 ∉ 𝑎)). 
 A related philosophical issue is not settled by the preceding principles. Suppose 𝑥 is a member 
of a set 𝑎 here in the actual world and that 𝑎 exists in some other possible world 𝑤. Then by E∈, 𝑥 is a member of 𝑎 in 𝑤. But nothing follows about 𝑥’s existence in 𝑤. For all we know from E∈, 
all sets might exist necessarily, even those that have contingent members, members that might not 
themselves have existed. Hence, if that is so, the singleton set {Merkel}, for example, would have 
existed even if Merkel hadn’t. However, on most conceptions of set, sets are ontologically 
dependent upon their members and, hence, could not themselves exist without their members 
existing; there could be no singleton set {Merkel} without Merkel. On such a conception, then, we 
are in need of a further modal principle: 
OD □∀𝑎∀𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝑎 → □(𝐸!𝑎 → 𝐸!𝑥)).1 
Given OD and the assumption that Merkel is a contingent being, ◇¬𝐸!𝑚, it now follows that the 
set {Merkel} too is contingent, as expected; it fails to exist at any Merkel-free possible world. 
Surprisingly, at first blush anyway, the assumption that there are contingent beings is neither 
philosophically nor mathematically trivial. Regarding the latter, it is a well-known theorem of the 
simplest and most straightforward system of modal predicate logic that there neither are nor could 
have been any contingent beings, i.e., that, necessarily, everything there is exists necessarily: 
NE □∀𝑥□𝐸!𝑥.2 
 
1 The three principles above are still jointly consistent with the possibility of sets 𝑎 that contain members 𝑥 that cannot 
coexist with 𝑎. This (rather perverse) possibility can be ruled out by replacing OD with a principle asserting that the 
membership relation is existence entailing: □∀𝑎□∀𝑥□(𝑥 ∈ 𝑎 → (𝐸!𝑎 ∧ 𝐸!𝑥)). Given E∈, both E∉ and OD follow 
(assuming the propositional modal logic S5). 
2 See (Menzel, 2018) for a formal proof of this and other controversial theorems in the simplest modal predicate logic, 
as well as discussion of the surrounding philosophical issues.  
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Avoiding this consequence requires choosing between restrictions (of varying severity) on one’s 
logical system, each with its own virtues and liabilities.3 However, some philosophers — so-called 
necessitists — embrace NE (from which, of course, OD trivially follows) and choose instead to 
offer sophisticated philosophical explanations of the allegedly mistaken naïve intuition that some 
things might not have existed.4 The choice of a logic and the adoption of a philosophical standpoint 
about the metaphysics of sets are therefore interestingly interdependent. 
 It is not our purpose here to adjudicate these issues. Rather, the point of this initial section has 
been to illustrate one powerful motivation for modal set theory, namely, its usefulness as a tool for 
exploring quite traditional lines of inquiry in modal metaphysics concerning contingency, 
essentiality, ontological dependence, and the like that surface naturally in connection with the 
existence of sets.5 The remainder of this article, however, will be devoted to recent development 
in modal set theory with regard to a rather more directed inquiry into both the nature and structure 
of sets that is motivated in particular by the attractive prospect of a satisfying explanation of 
Russell’s Paradox. 
2 ZF and Russell’s Paradox6 
The years 1897-1903 saw the emergence of a string of related paradoxes concerning the notions 
of number, set, class, property, proposition, and truth.7 Among those concerning sets, Russell’s 
Paradox is undoubtedly the best known and arguably the one most directly responsible for 
subsequent developments in the foundations of mathematics. The argument is well-known. Its 
heart, of course, is the principle of naïve comprehension, i.e., the principle that, for any property 
of things, there is the set of things that have that property. More formally (and somewhat 
anachronistically) expressed in the language of first-order logic, it is the principle that, for any 
predicate	𝜑(𝑥), there is the set of things it is true of: 
 
3 The system Q of (Prior, 1968) is the most severely restricted of well-known systems, abandoning in particular the 
interdefinability of □ and à and most familiar principles of propositional modal logic. For examples of less severely 
restricted systems, see (Kripke, 1963), (Fine, 1978), and (Menzel, 1991). 
4 The term “necessitism” and its cognates was coined in (Williamson, 2010), although the view was in large measure 
anticipated and developed in detail in (Linsky & Zalta, 1994). See also (Salmon, 1987) for an influential precursor. 
5 (Van Cleve, 1985) is a fine exploration of the issues raised in this section. See also (Fine, 1981) for a detailed and 
rather more formal study. 
6 The exposition in this section is similar to that found in Sections 3-6 of (Menzel, 2017), which was written largely 
in parallel with the current entry, albeit toward very different ends. 
7 See (Cantini, 2014) for an excellent overview. 
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NC ∃𝑎∀𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝑎 ↔ 𝜑(𝑥)), where ‘𝑎’ is not free in 𝜑(𝑥). 
Intuitively, at first sight anyway, the principle seems airtight. For a well-defined predicate 
unambiguously picks out some existing things (or perhaps no things at all), and what more could 
you need for the existence of a set than the existence of its purported members, the things that 
constitute it? For all its intuitive appeal, of course, NC is inconsistent: given the well-defined 
predicate ‘𝑥 ∉ 𝑥’, by NC we have the “Russell set” 𝑟 containing exactly those things 𝑥 that are 
not members of themselves, i.e.,   
R ∀𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝑟 ↔ 𝑥 ∉ 𝑥). 
Instantiating with 𝑟, the contradiction that 𝑟 ∈ 𝑟 if and only if 𝑟 ∉ 𝑟 follows immediately. 
 The best known and most influential response to Russell’s Paradox is of course that of Ernst 
Zermelo. To express Zermelo’s ideas, it is useful to speak of mere pluralities of things, where such 
talk is to be thought of as “ontologically innocent”. That is, talk of a plurality of things is not to be 
understood to refer to some additional thing over and above the things we are talking about — a 
set or class or mereological sum that they constitute — but, rather, simply as a convenient way of 
talking about those things jointly, or collectively, as we seem freely to do when we use plural noun 
phrases in sentences like “It took three men to lift the piano” and “The fans went wild”. The lesson 
of Russell’s Paradox, then, in these terms, is that not all pluralities of things can safely be assumed 
to constitute a further thing, viz., a set that contains them; in particular, to assume without 
qualification, as NC would have it, that the things an arbitrary predicate is true of constitute a set 
can be logically catastrophic. At the same time, some pluralities seem clearly safe. Zermelo’s 
brilliantly executed idea (Zermelo, 1908)8 — implemented in his axiomatic set theory Z — was to 
stipulate the existence of some initial sets to get things going and then introduce a variety of sound 
“set-building” operations that lead safely from given objects or sets to new sets. We will describe 
Z in some detail. 
Zermelo begins with the extensionality axiom Ext. His next axiom, the axiom of elementary 
sets, is actually a combination of an existence axiom and a set-building axiom. Specifically, he 
postulates the existence of the empty set ∅, 
 
8 Translated as (Zermelo, 1967); see also the informative introductory note by Felgner that accompanies the translation 
of this paper in the polyglot edition (Zermelo, 2010) of Zermelo’s collected works, pp. 160-89. Zermelo’s theory 
included the important but controversial axiom of Choice, though it will play no part here. 
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ES ∃𝑎∀𝑥 𝑥 ∉ 𝑎, 
and introduces the axiom of Pairing, which says, in effect, that any pair of (not necessarily distinct) 
objects 𝑥 and 𝑦 are jointly safe and hence constitute a set {𝑥, 𝑦}:9 
Pr ∃𝑎∀𝑧(𝑧 ∈ 𝑎 ↔ (𝑧 = 𝑥 ∨ 𝑧 = 𝑦)). 
Assuming extensionality, these two axioms alone already give us the power to prove the existence 
of the infinite series of Zermelo numbers ∅, {∅}, {{∅}}, {{{∅}}}, …, so-called because they served 
as Zermelo’s surrogates for the natural numbers. (For convenience, abbreviate them, respectively, 
as ∅A, ∅B, ∅C, ∅D, … .) However, in addition to so-called “pure” sets like these that are “built up” 
solely from the empty set, Zermelo also made room in his theory for the existence of arbitrarily 
many urelements, that is, things that are not themselves sets — persons, planets, natural numbers, 
etc. — and, hence, by Pr, for the existence of “impure” sets built up from them. And although he 
didn’t explicitly assume it as an axiom in 1908, it is in the spirit of his theory to take the urelements 
to constitute a set 𝑈 of their own:10 
Ur ∃𝑎∀𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝑎 ↔ (𝑥 ≠ ∅ ∧ ∀𝑦 𝑦 ∉ 𝑥)). 
Let ZU be Zermelo’s theory Z with the additional axiom Ur. 
NC is of course absent from Zermelo’s theory but a significant remnant of it remains in the 
form of a set-building principle, Separation. Given a predicate 𝜑(𝑥), NC called sets into being ex 
nihilo from the things of which 𝜑(𝑥) is true. Separation, by contrast, only vouches for the things 
in some previously given set 𝑏 that 𝜑(𝑥) is true of: 
Sep ∃𝑎∀𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝑎 ↔ (𝑥 ∈ 𝑏 ∧ 𝜑(𝑥)), where ‘𝑎’ is not free in 𝜑(𝑥).11 
Zermelo’s next two set-building axioms are Union and Powerset, which tell us, respectively, 
that, for a given set 𝑏, the members of the members of 𝑏 as well as the subsets of 𝑏 safely constitute 
sets of their own: 
 
9 We will make free use of the common {𝑥B, … , 𝑥H} notation for finite sets without defining it formally. 
10 The existence of U is not entirely unproblematic, as it could turn out to be inconsistent with the other axioms if there 
are “too many” urelements. See, e.g., (Nolan, 1996) and (Menzel, 2014). Zermelo himself wasn’t sure how to work 
urelements into his theory until over two decades later; see (Zermelo, 1930) and Kanamori’s informative introductory 
note to its translation in (Zermelo, 2010), pp. 390-430. 
11 Sep renders ES otiose, since it is a truth of (classical first-order) logic that something 𝑥 exists, ∃𝑥𝐸!𝑥, from which 
ES follows directly from Pr and the instance of Sep where 𝜑(𝑥) is 𝑥 ≠ 𝑥. 
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Un ∃𝑎∀𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝑎 ↔ ∃𝑐(𝑐 ∈ 𝑏 ∧ 𝑥 ∈ 𝑐)) 
Pow ∃𝑎∀𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝑎 ↔ 𝑥 ⊆ 𝑏). 
Although formulated decades before the mature conception of the set theoretic universe in 
(Zermelo, 1930), these two axioms clearly anticipated it. For, given the initial set 𝑈 of urelements 
— call it 𝑈A — by Pow the set ℘(𝑈A) of all of its subsets exists. By Pr and Un, we have the set 𝑈B = 	𝑈A ∪ ℘(𝑈A)12 consisting of all the members of 𝑈A and ℘(𝑈A). Applying Pow again we have 
the set ℘(𝑈B) of all the subsets of 𝑈B which we can then join with 𝑈B itself to yield the set 𝑈C =𝑈B ∪ ℘(𝑈B). In general: 
D1 
𝑈A = 𝑈𝑈HOB = 𝑈H ∪ ℘(𝑈H). 
Even in Zermelo’s early work, then, the sets are naturally taken to have a structure that is 
cumulative and hierarchical, advancing “upwards” via iterations of the powerset and (binary) 
union operations, from an initial stock of urelements, in an ever-expanding series of stages, or 
levels, each successive level 𝑈HOB consisting of everything in the preceding level together with all 
the sets that can be formed from them, as indicated in Figure 1. 
Say that one level 𝑈H is higher than another 𝑈Q just in case 𝑛 > 𝑚 (equivalently, in light of 
their cumulative nature, just in case  𝑈Q ⊂ 𝑈H) and that the level 𝜆(𝑥) of an object 𝑥 is the first 
level of the hierarchy in which it occurs.  Since (a) we begin with a base set 𝑈A of urelements, (b) 
the hierarchy grows discretely from one level to the next, and (c) a set of level 𝑈HOB is always 
constituted by objects in level 𝑈H, it should also be clear that the sets on this conception are all 
well-founded: no set can be a member of itself and, more generally, there are no infinitely 
descending membership chains … ∈ 𝑎HOB ∈ 𝑎H ∈ … ∈ 𝑎B ∈ 𝑎A. Since the axioms above do not 
explicitly rule out such structural impossibilities, it must be done independently by means of a 
separate principle; in Z, this is the axiom of Foundation, which requires every nonempty set 𝑎 to 
have a member with which it shares no members: 
 
12 𝑎 ∪ 𝑏 is the binary union of sets 𝑎 and 𝑏, and is definable as the set whose existence follows by Un from the set {𝑎, 𝑏}, whose existence in turn follows from 𝑎 and 𝑏 by Pr. 
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Fnd 𝑎 ≠ ∅ → ∃𝑦(𝑦 ∈ 𝑎 ∧ ∀𝑧(𝑧 ∈ 𝑦 → 𝑧 ∉ 𝑎)).13 
We turn now to the critical Zermelian axiom of Infinity. What is particularly important about 
this axiom, especially for purposes here, is that it asserts not merely the safety of an infinite 
plurality — Ur will have already done that on the assumption that there are infinitely many 
urelements — but, rather, the safety of a plurality that is finitely unbounded, i.e., unbounded (hence 
infinite) in our hierarchy of finite (i.e., finitely-indexed) levels 𝑈H. Consider, in particular, the 
Zermelo numbers ∅A, ∅B, ∅C, … . As 𝜆(∅V) = 𝑈VOB, for all natural numbers 𝑖, it follows that, for 
every finite level 𝑈H, no matter how high, there is a Zermelo number (∅H, for example) that only 
first occurs in a higher level still; the Zermelo numbers are thus unbounded in the hierarchy of 
finite levels 𝑈A, 𝑈B, 𝑈C, … and, hence, never constitute a set in any of them. 
 The Zermelo numbers, then, are of a rather different sort structurally than any we’ve 
encountered hitherto. But, ultimately, from the realist’s standpoint, at least, there doesn’t seem to 
be any more reason to question their safety than there is to question the safety of the urelements 
that we sanction in Ur that get the hierarchy going in the first place or the plurality of subsets of a 
given level that we sanction in Pow that enable us, at any given level, to extend the hierarchy to 
 
13 Zermelo did not include Foundation in his 1908 axiomatization but, as non-well-founded sets were not defined and 
studied in any systematic way until (Mirimanoff, 1917) and the iterative conception was at most only beginning to 
take shape in Zermelo’s mind, it seems likely that he did not at the time recognize any pressing need for the axiom. 
Figure 1: The finite levels of the cumulative hierarchy 
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the next level. For, just as in those cases, all of the things in question are there and hence available 
for collection into a set. Moreover, as the Zermelo numbers are unbounded in the hierarchy of 
finite levels and hence could not constitute a set at any such level, the set they would constitute 
would demonstrably not be a member of itself. So the assumption that they are jointly safe does 
not appear to raise the specter of a Russell-style paradox. Accordingly, Zermelo’s Infinity axiom 
posits the collective safely of the Zermelo numbers the way that Ur does for the urelements and 
Pow does for the subsets of a given set. More exactly, it declares that there is a set that contains 
the Zermelo numbers: 
Inf ∃𝑎(∅ ∈ 𝑎 ∧ ∀𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝑎 → {𝑥} ∈ 𝑎)). 
The set of Zermelo numbers proper — call it 𝜁 (zeta) — can then be derived straightaway by Sep.14 
 So the axiom of Infinity implies, not just that there are infinite sets, but that there are infinite 
sets whose members occur at arbitrarily high finite levels of the hierarchy. Hence, intuitively, the 
cumulative hierarchy 𝑈A, 𝑈B, 𝑈C, …, of levels must continue beyond the finite. For this to be 
provable, however, we must first show that they themselves form a set {𝑈A, 𝑈B, 𝑈C, … }. It certainly 
seems that they should, for exactly the same reasons that were cited for the safety of the structurally 
similar plurality of Zermelo numbers — they are all there and no obvious paradox arises from the 
assumption that they constitute a set. But Inf and the other axioms of ZU are not enough to 
guarantee this.15 Thus, a further principle is needed, one typically attributed to Abraham 
Fraenkel,16 the axiom schema of Replacement, the addition of which to Zermelo’s theory Z(U) 
gives us ZF(U). Replacement captures the structural intuition that if the members of a given set 𝑏 
can be correlated one-to-one with a given plurality, then that plurality also constitutes a set. More 
formally, where ∃!𝑥𝜑 as usual means that something is uniquely 𝜑: 
Rep ∀𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝑏 → ∃!𝑦𝜓(𝑥, 𝑦)) → ∃𝑎∀𝑦(𝑦 ∈ 𝑎 ↔ ∃𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝑏 ∧ 𝜓(𝑥, 𝑦))). 
 
14 Specifically, by letting 𝑏 be the set given by Inf and letting 𝜑(𝑥)	be	∀𝑦[]∅ ∈ 𝑦 ∧ ∀𝑧(𝑧 ∈ 𝑦 → {𝑧} ∈ 𝑦)^ → 𝑥 ∈ 𝑦], 
i.e., the predicate “𝑥 is in every set 𝑦 that contains ∅ and the singleton of any of its members”. 
15 To see this, very briefly: where 𝑉a is the set of hereditarily finite pure sets, let 𝑊c = 𝑉a ∪ 𝑈 and 𝑊HOB = 𝑊H ∪℘(𝑊H), for 𝑛 ∈ ℕ, and let 𝑊 = ⋃H∈ℕ𝑊H. It is easy to see that 𝑊 is a model of ZU (recall that 𝑉aOa ⊆ 𝑊 is a model 
of Z) and that 𝑈V ∈ 𝑊 for all 𝑖 ∈ ℕ but that {𝑈A, 𝑈B, 𝑈C, … } ∉ 𝑊. The author thanks Noah Schweber and Joel David 
Hamkins for this construction. 
16 Skolem independently identified the need for Replacement, and his explicitly first-order formulation of the principle 
is essentially the one that is mostly used today. See (Fraenkel, 1922) and (Skolem, 1922); an English translation of 
the latter can be found in (van Heijenoort, 1967), pp. 290-301. 
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To see how Rep enables us to show that the finite levels are jointly safe, let 𝐿(𝑦) mean that 𝑦 
is a finite levels.17 Let 𝜓(𝑥, 𝑦) be ‘𝑥 ∈ 𝜁 ∧ 𝐿(𝑦) ∧ 𝑥 ∈ 𝑦 ∧ ∀𝑧((𝐿(𝑧) ∧ 𝑥 ∈ 𝑧) → 𝑦 ⊆ 𝑧)’, i.e., “𝑥 
is a Zermelo number and 𝑦 is its level”. 𝜓(𝑥, 𝑦) correlates the members of 𝜁 one-to-one with the 
levels 𝑈B, 𝑈C, … and, hence, by Rep, they constitute a set to which (by Pr and Un) we can add the 
initial level 𝑈A of urelements; so all the levels jointly constitute our desired set {𝑈A, 𝑈B, 𝑈C, … }. By 
Un their union is a set, so all the members of all the finite levels do indeed form a set 𝑈a of their 
own, the first transfinite level of the hierarchy18 — the result, as it were, of putting a “disk” atop 
the hierarchy of finite levels depicted in Figure 1 indicating its “completion” in a further level. 
That of course is not the end of the hierarchy but simply a new starting point for iterating the 
powerset and binary union operations to generate yet further levels 𝑈aOB, 𝑈aOC, …, which (by 
Rep) jointly form a set and hence (by Un) constitute a new limit level 𝑈aOa, and thus once again 
further levels 𝑈aOaOB, 𝑈aOaOC, …, and so on, as depicted in Figure 2. In general, then, by 
including a limit clause representing the continual “completion” of these unbounded series of 
levels, we can define the entire transfinite cumulative hierarchy for all ordinal numbers, finite and 
transfinite alike: 
D2 
𝑈A = 𝑈𝑈gOB = 𝑈g ∪ ℘(𝑈g)𝑈h = ⋃gih𝑈g,	for limit ordinals γ 
This intuitive and deeply satisfying conception of the structure of the set theoretic universe 
yields a compelling explanation of Russell’s Paradox: a plurality safely constitutes a set if and only 
if it is bounded in the full cumulative hierarchy, that is, if and only if there is a level of the hierarchy 
at or before which the plurality “runs out”, that is, a level 𝑈g such that, for everything 𝑥 in that 
plurality, 𝜆(𝑥) is no higher than 𝑈g — in which case those things are “available” to be collected 
into a set at the next level 𝑈gOB. However, some predicates — notably, ‘𝑥 ∉ 𝑥’ — pick out 
absolutely unbounded pluralities, pluralities that never “run out” by any level.19 Accordingly, as 
 
17 𝐿(𝑦) is definable without any mention of finitude as: ∀𝑎[(𝑈 ∈ 𝑎 ∧ ∀𝑏(𝑏 ∈ 𝑎 → 𝑏 ∪ ℘(𝑏) ∈ 𝑎)) → 𝑦 ∈ 𝑎], i.e., “𝑦 
is in every set that contains the set 𝑈 of urelements and also contains 𝑏 ∪ ℘(𝑏) whenever it contains 𝑏, for any set 𝑏”. 
18 𝜔 is the first transfinite ordinal number, i.e., the first “counting number” after the natural numbers. It is also the first 
limit ordinal, i.e., the first ordinal 𝛼 > 0 such that, if 𝛽 < 𝛼, then 𝛽 + 1 < 𝛼. See (Devlin, 1991), Ch. 3 for a good 
introduction to transfinite ordinals and cardinals and their arithmetic. 




in Russell’s Paradox, the assumption that they do — i.e., the assumption that they constitute sets 
— leads to contradiction. 
3 Modal Set Theory and the Completion Problem 
Unfortunately, as satisfying and illuminating as this explanation might be, a serious puzzle remains 
for the realist who wants to take the existence of sets seriously: the full cumulative hierarchy is 
itself a well-defined plurality; why is it not safe? That is, why does the hierarchy itself fail to be 
“completed” so as to constitute a set? Note the question is not: Why is there no universal set, i.e., 
no set containing all the urelements and all the sets? As we’ve just seen, the iterative conception 
of set provides a cogent answer to that question: only those pluralities that “run out” by some level 
of the cumulative hierarchy constitute sets at the next level and, obviously, the entire hierarchy is 
not such a plurality; there is no level at which the members of all the levels form a set. Rather, the 
question is: Why is the hierarchy only as “high” as it is? Why do all the urelements and sets that 
there actually are fail to constitute a further level that kicks off yet another series of iterations? For 































Figure 2: The transfinite cumulative hierarchy 
 11 
less to the full hierarchy: all of the urelements and sets in all the levels are there, as robustly as the 
members of the finite levels; moreover, since the set they would constitute — call it 𝑈p — would 
be of a higher level than its members and, hence, would not be a member of itself, just as with 𝑈a, 
no obvious threat of paradox looms. Call this the completion problem. 
Granted, the completion problem does not appear to be as grave and immediate a threat to the 
coherence of set theory as Russell’s Paradox. But it does raise disturbing questions for the realist: 
if there is no answer to the completion problem, then there is an essential element of randomness 
to set existence. For once we acknowledge that there are pluralities that inexplicably fail to 
constitute sets, it is hard to see what grounds there are for picking and choosing between those that 
do and those that don’t: in particular, if the same reasons for accepting that the finite levels 𝑈A, 𝑈B, 𝑈C, … constitute a set seem to hold for all the levels of the hierarchy without their 
constituting a set, then what reason to do we have for accepting that even the finite levels 𝑈A, 𝑈B, 𝑈C, … do? Or that any plurality does for that matter? Without a solution to the completion 
problem, then, the actual structure of the hierarchy appears to be unknowable; any claims to 
knowledge of it would appear to be groundless, as the objects of the purported knowledge might 
well concern entities that simply do not exist. 
 Putnam was the first to argue explicitly that such questions are answered by taking the 
principles underlying the iterative conception of set to be essentially modal and, more specifically, 
by suggesting that a set is not to be understood in terms of the actual existence of a finished thing 
but as the possibility of its formation:20 
[T]here is not, from a mathematical point of view, any significant difference 
between the assertion that there exists a set of integers satisfying an arithmetical 
condition and the assertion that it is possible to select integers so as to satisfy the 
condition. Sets, [to parody] John Stuart Mill, are permanent possibilities of 
selection.21 
 
20 (Putman, 1967), p. 12. See (Hellman, 1989) for a detailed development of Putnam’s ideas and (Roberts, 2018) for 
a rigorous critique. 
21 There are intimations of Putnam’s idea in Cantor, notably in an 1897 letter to Hilbert: “I say of a set that it can be 
thought of as finished ... if it is possible without contradiction (as can be done with finite sets) to think of all its 
elements as existing together, and so to think of the set itself as a compounded thing for itself ; or (in other words) if 
it is possible to imagine the set as actually existing with the totality of its elements.” (Ewald, 1996), p. 927. The 
emphasis is Cantor’s. 
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Parsons (1977) spells the idea out a little less metaphorically in a thesis — call it Parsons’ 
Principle — that addresses the completion problem directly: any given plurality of things “can 
constitute a set, but it is not necessary that they do.” Thus, necessarily, no matter how many 
cumulative levels there might be, the absolutely unbounded pluralities that don’t in fact constitute 
sets in any level nonetheless could have constituted sets. The answer to the completion problem 
on this potentialist conception of sets, then, is simply that there neither is nor could be a 
“completed” cumulative hierarchy. Rather, instead of the completed stages of the cumulative 
hierarchy, we have a potential hierarchy, i.e., roughly speaking, an infinite hierarchy of 
possibilities where, given any possible completion of the hierarchy up to a given level 𝑈g, there is 
always a more expansive possibility in which some of the mere pluralities of 𝑈g constitute sets — 
in the “maximal” case, a possibility comprising the next level 𝑈gOB. The completion problem only 
arises on the  assumption that all the levels — hence all the sets — that there could be (relative to 
an initial set 𝑈A of urelements) are already actual and, hence, that the hierarchy of sets is complete, 
that there is no more “collecting” of pluralities into sets that can be done. For only under that 
assumption — call it actualism — is it mysterious why the hierarchy is only as high as it is, why 
it (or indeed any absolutely unbounded plurality) fails to constitute a further set. The potentialist 
rejects the actualist assumption: the unbounded pluralities of one possible world always constitute 
sets in further, more comprehensive worlds. 
 What becomes of ZF on the potentialist conception? Thought of semantically, the potentialist 
conception suggests (roughly put) that an assertion to the effect that a certain set exists — and 
hence occurs at some level of the cumulative hierarchy — should be understood as the assertion 
that it is possible that such a set exist; likewise, assertions about all sets should be understood, not 
simply as assertions about the sets that in fact exist but, roughly speaking, about all the sets there 
could be, all the sets in any possible world.22 Formalized, this insight yields what Linnebo (2013) 
calls the potentialist translation 𝜑◇ of a sentence 𝜑 of ordinary set theory, viz., the result of 
replacing every existential quantifier occurrence ∃ in 𝜑 with its modalized counterpart ◇∃ and 
every universal quantifier occurrence ∀ with □∀. The idea, then, is that, if a statement 𝜑 of ordinary 
ZF set theory is purportedly true in the cumulative hierarchy, its modalized counterpart 𝜑◇ will be 
true in the potential hierarchy. This in turn might suggest that modal set theory will simply consist 
 
22 The exposition from this point draws heavily upon (Linnebo, 2010; 2013) which in turn was strongly influenced by 
(Parsons, 1983).  
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in formulating the theory ZF◇ that results from replacing the axioms of ZF with their potentialist 
translations. But that would not in and of itself be terribly interesting. Instead, modal set theorists 
like Parsons and Linnebo opt for the far more illuminating tack of taking the potentialist conception 
itself as primary and, hence, by axiomatizing its fundamental principles, deriving the axioms of ZF◇. 
 The first task toward that end is to identify the right propositional modal logic for the 
potentialist conception. Expressed in terms of possible worlds, the basic underlying intuition is 
that the universe of sets in a given world 𝑤 can always be increased — for any world 𝑤 there is 
an accessible world 𝑤′ that includes, not only everything already in 𝑤, but new sets whose 
members are mere pluralities in 𝑤.23 This can be captured more formally by means of several 
intuitive constraints on world domains 𝐷(𝑤) and the accessibility relation 𝑅. Specifically, growth 
is reflected in the inclusion constraint that, if 𝑅𝑤𝑤′, then 𝐷(𝑤) ⊆ 𝐷(𝑤v).24 𝑅 itself should be a 
partial order (i.e., reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric) — each world 𝑤′ accessible from a 
world 𝑤 represents a way in which some of the mere pluralities of 𝑤 constitute fully-fledged sets 
in 𝑤′, but different pluralities of 𝑤 might constitute sets in different accessible worlds. Moreover, 
that the formation of new sets proceeds discretely is reflected in the requirement that 𝑅 be weakly 
well-founded.25 Finally, if 𝑤B and 𝑤C represent distinct expansions of the set theoretic universe of 
a world 𝑤 — different “choices” of which mere pluralities of 𝑤 to take to constitute sets — it 
should still be possible in each world to form the sets constituted in the other. Hence, a further 
natural condition is that accessibility be directed, that is, that, for any two worlds 𝑤B, 𝑤C accessible 
from a given world 𝑤 there is a third world accessible from both and, hence, given the inclusion 
constraint, one whose sets include all those formed in either world. The propositional modal logic 
 
23 For fairly obvious reasons, possible world semantics can only be considered a useful heuristic, as Kripke models 
are themselves by definition sets. Hence, no Kripke model could purport to represent (in a one-to-one fashion) all 
possible sets (over some initial collection 𝑈 of urelements) without opening the door once again to Russell’s Paradox. 
(And allowing “class-size” Kripke models would only give rise to a version of the completion problem if one claimed 
that such a model could include all possible sets — why isn’t there a further world encompassing all the sets in that 
model?) This does, however, raise the further question of what it means for the potentialist translation of a theorem of 
ZF to be true, if it is not true in virtue of facts about genuinely existing sets in genuinely existing possible worlds. 
24 This will of course have the consequence that, for any object 𝑥, including urelements, it will be a logical truth that 𝑥 exists necessarily, □𝐸!𝑥. That is the right result, as the constraints in question are only meant intuitively to capture 
possible ways of extending the set theoretic universe of a given world 𝑤; nothing in 𝑤 “goes away” as new sets are 
added in accessible worlds. 
25 𝑅 is weakly well-founded if every nonempty set 𝑆 of worlds contains an 𝑅-minimal world, i.e., a world 𝑤 ∈ 𝑆 such 
that, for all other 𝑢 ∈ 𝑆, not-𝑅𝑢𝑤. (𝑅 is well-founded if it is a strict partial order — irreflexive and transitive — that 
satisfies this definition.) 
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determined by these conditions on accessibility is S4.2, the normal modal logic that includes the 
familiar axioms of the logic S4, viz.,  
T □𝜑 → 𝜑 
4 □𝜑 → □□𝜑 
corresponding to reflexivity and transitivity, respectively, and the axiom 
G ◇□𝜑 → □◇𝜑 
corresponding to directedness.26 And to S4.2 is added classical quantification theory with identity 
and the axiom ‘𝑥 ≠ 𝑦 → □𝑥 ≠ 𝑦’ expressing the necessity of difference. 
Now, as seen above, it is useful to express the axioms of ZF informally in terms of pluralities. 
To characterize the potentialist conception properly with the tools of modal logic, it is essential to 
quantify over pluralities explicitly in order to identify the logical principles that govern their 
behavior. Accordingly, we introduce plural variables ‘𝑥𝑥’, ‘𝑦𝑦’, etc. and a new type of atomic 
formula ‘𝑦 ≺ 𝑥𝑥’ to indicate that 𝑦 is one of the things 𝑥𝑥. The inference rules for plural quantifiers 
parallel those for first-order quantifiers exactly.27 
Several principles capture the existence and nature of pluralities. First, given the ontological 
innocence of plural quantification, the plural counterpart to NC seems harmless:28 
PC ∃𝑥𝑥∀𝑦(𝑦 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ↔ 𝜑(𝑦)), where ‘𝑥𝑥’ does not occur free in 𝜑(𝑦), 
that is, simply put, for any predicate 𝜑(𝑦), there are the things it is true of.29 Next, the modal 
properties of pluralities are captured in two axioms expressing the stability of the ≺ relation, that 
 
26 There is no axiom corresponding to antisymmetry because it is not definable in propositional modal logic. See, e.g., 
(Blackburn, de Rijke, & Venema, 2001), §4.5. Well-foundedness can be axiomatized in a bimodal extension of 
propositional modal logic with both “forward-looking” and “backward-looking” necessity operators. See (Studd, 
2013). 
27 See (Linnebo, 2014) for a useful overview of plural quantification and (Oliver and Smiley, 2013) for a 
comprehensive treatment of plural logic. 
28 Though see (Spencer, 2012). 
29 As Linnebo points out (2013, p. 210), PC entails the existence of an “empty” plurality. This can be avoided at the 
cost of some inconvenience. As to PC’s harmlessness, note that a Russell-style argument to a contradiction from PC 
with 𝜑(𝑦) = ‘𝑦 ⊀ 𝑦’ (assuming that construction is even permitted syntactically) breaks down, as it is in general 
invalid to infer from the fact that all things (distributively) have a property 𝐹, that any things (collectively) have 𝐹. 
Hence, from ∀𝑦𝜑(𝑦) we cannot legitimately infer 𝜑(𝑥𝑥); in particular, we can’t infer 𝑥𝑥 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ↔ 𝑥𝑥 ⊀ 𝑥𝑥 from ∀𝑦(𝑦 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ↔ 𝑦 ⊀ 𝑦). For more on distributive vs. collective quantification, see, e.g., (Scha, 1984) and (McKay, 
2006). 
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is, that, for any plurality 𝑥𝑥 and object 𝑦 in a given world 𝑤, 𝑦 will be among the things 𝑥𝑥 in an 
arbitrary accessible world 𝑤′ if and only if it is among them in 𝑤: 
Stb≺O 𝑦 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 → □(𝑦 ≺ 𝑥𝑥) 
Stb≺ 𝑦 ⊀ 𝑥𝑥 → □(𝑦 ⊀ 𝑥𝑥). 
However, these axioms don’t rule out the possibility that 𝑥𝑥 grows in a further world 𝑤′, that 𝑥𝑥 
includes a new object 𝑧 that only first comes to exist in 𝑤′. This possibility is ruled out by means 
of a schema that ensures that pluralities are inextensible: 
InEx≺ ∀𝑦(𝑦 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 → □𝜑) → □∀𝑦(𝑦 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 → 𝜑).30  
Let MPFO be this system of plural first-order modal logic. 
 The next task is to extend MPFO to a basic modal set theory BMST. Like ZF, BMST 
axiomatizes the two fundamental structural properties of sets, viz., extensionality and foundation,31 
which are captured simply by adopting the axioms Ext and Fnd (hence also their necessitations). 
Recall from Section 1 above, however, that sets also have their members essentially, as expressed 
in the principles E∈ and E∉.32 Both of these principles, as well as the inextensibility of 
membership, are entailed by the following: 𝐄𝐃∈ ∃𝑥𝑥□∀𝑦(𝑦 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ↔ 𝑦 ∈ 𝑎). 
Together with the stability and inextensibility principles for pluralities above, 𝐄𝐃∈ says that, for 
any set 𝑎, one and the same plurality of things constitute 𝑎 in every (accessible) possible world. 
 
30 To understand how this works to ensure inextensibility it is useful to note that InEx≺ is just the Barcan formula 
(BF) — ∀𝑦□𝜑 → □∀𝑦𝜑 — restricted to pluralities 𝑥𝑥. The semantic effect of unrestricted BF is that, so to say, 
existence is inextensible, i.e., that there couldn’t have been anything that doesn’t already exist in fact, a notoriously 
problematic metaphysical claim (see (Menzel, 2018), esp. sections 1 and 2). For suppose there could have been 
something 𝑎 distinct from everything that exists in fact. Then ∀𝑦□(𝑦 ≠ 𝑎). But then by BF, □∀𝑦(𝑦 ≠ 𝑎), 
contradicting the assumption that such an 𝑎 could have existed. Restricted as in InEx≺, however, the semantic effect 
is simply that, for a given plurality 𝑥𝑥, there couldn’t have been anything 𝑎 among them that isn’t already among 
them, i.e., that pluralities are inextensible. 
31 Foundation follows semantically from the weak well-foundedness of the accessibility relation 𝑅 and the fundamental 
potentialist assumption that the members of any set that first comes to be in any world 𝑤 is constituted by objects that 
exist in some world 𝑢 such that 𝑅𝑢𝑤. See (Linnebo, 2013), pp. 216-17. 
32 Since □𝐸!𝑎 is a simple theorem of MPFO, the antecedents 𝐸!𝑎 of the conditionals in the consequents of these two 
principles are superfluous in the context of BMST. 
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 Recall that the general intuitive motivation for the naïve comprehension principle NC was that 
the existence of the members of a purported set should suffice for the existence of the set, which 
we can now express generally, and formally, in terms of plural quantification: 
GNC ∀𝑥𝑥∃𝑎∀𝑦(𝑦 ∈ 𝑎 ↔ 𝑦 ≺ 𝑥𝑥). 
Given the innocent principle PC, NC (and catastrophe) follow immediately from GNC. As we’ve 
seen, both actualist and potentialist accounts have explanations of where GNC goes wrong based 
intuitively on the iterative conception of set. On both accounts, in one sense or another, sets are 
“constructed” level-by-level without end, the new sets of one level constituted by the mere 
pluralities of previous levels. Hence, necessarily, the plurality of all the sets in all the levels, and 
unbounded pluralities generally, fail to constitute sets. Both accounts thus agree on where GNC 
gets it wrong: necessarily, there are pluralities that don’t constitute sets. Additionally, however, 
the potentialist conception avoids the completion problem by showing that GNC almost gets it 
right: it’s not that every plurality does constitute a set; it’s that every plurality could. From the 
potentialist standpoint, then, GNC simply missed the implicit modality in claims of set existence; 
what we need is just its potentialist translation: 
C □∀𝑥𝑥◇∃𝑎□∀𝑦(𝑦 ∈ 𝑎 ↔ 𝑦 ≺ 𝑥𝑥). 
That is, necessarily, any plurality of things could constitute a set consisting (necessarily) of exactly 
those things. This, of course, is a precise formalization of Parsons’ Principle. Let BMST be the 
result of adding the axioms Ext, Fnd, 𝐄𝐃∈, and C to MPFO. 
 It is a simple matter to show that BMST proves the potentialist translations of all of the ZF 
axioms except Pow, Inf, and Rep.33 As these are by far the most powerful axioms of ZF, this 
shows that our basic intuitions about pluralities and sets as expressed in BMST — in particular, 
Parsons’ Principle C — only get us so far. To see this with regard to Pow, suppose we have a 
plurality 𝑥𝑥 in some world 𝑤. By principle C there is a world 𝑢 accessible from 𝑤 in which they 
constitute a set 𝑏. Obviously, all the “subpluralities” of 𝑥𝑥 — all the pluralities 𝑦𝑦 such that each 
thing in them is among the things 𝑥𝑥 — also exist in 𝑤. But neither C nor the structure of worlds 
and their domains in the underlying semantics provides any guarantee that any of them (other than 
 
33 See (Linnebo 2013, p. 221) and (Parsons 1983), Appendix 2. The addition of the urelement axiom Ur, which neither 
Linnebo nor Parsons includes in their discussions, would involve no significant complications. 
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𝑥𝑥) constitute a set in 𝑢, let alone all of them. Indeed, for all we know on the potentialist conception 
to this point, the subpluralities of 𝑥𝑥 might be inexhaustible in the sense that, for any world 𝑢 
accessible from 𝑤, there is always a further world 𝑣 accessible from 𝑢 in which some subplurality 
of 𝑥𝑥 only first constitutes a set (hence, a subset of 𝑏). If so, there is no world where all possible 
subsets of 𝑏 exist, in which case the power set of 𝑏 is impossible, contrary to 𝐏𝐨𝐰◇, i.e., 
◇∃𝑎□∀𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝑎 ↔ 𝑥 ⊆ 𝑏). 
 To derive 𝐏𝐨𝐰◇, then, an additional principle is required that rules out this sort 
inexhaustibility. Intuitively, this is accomplished most naturally by assuming that worlds more 
directly reflect the levels of the cumulative hierarchy; that is, by assuming, not only that the newly-
formed sets of a given world are mere pluralities of some preceding world, but that set formation 
is always maximal: that the newly-formed sets of a world are all those that can be constituted from 
the mere pluralities of a preceding world.34 This assumption can be expressed elegantly in a single 
axiom to the effect that, much like its members, the subsets of a given set 𝑎 are constant across 
possible worlds: 𝐄𝐃⊆ ∃𝑥𝑥□∀𝑦(𝑦 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ↔ 𝑦 ⊆ 𝑎). 𝐏𝐨𝐰◇ now follows straightaway from BMST + 𝐄𝐃⊆. 
 Recall that ES and Pr alone suffice to generate the infinite plurality of Zermelo numbers ∅A, ∅B, ∅C, … and it was left to Inf simply to sanction a set containing them. If we could prove the 
mere possibility that all the Zermelo numbers exist on the potentialist conception, we could 
immediately invoke principle C to prove the possible existence of a set containing them. However, 
the potentialist is in a slightly more fraught situation. For the potentialist principles to this point 
— the derived principles 𝐄𝐒◇ and 𝐏𝐫◇ in particular — only yield a series of possible initial 
segments of the Zermelo numbers: by 𝐄𝐒◇ it is possible that ∅B exists; and by iterated applications 
of 𝐏𝐫◇, it is possible that ∅A and ∅B exist and hence also that the numbers ∅A, ∅B, and ∅C exist, 
and so on, but without the entire series of Zermelo numbers ever being “completed” in a single 
possibility. 
 
34 Linnebo (2013, p. 209, fn 7) suggests that maximality entails that the accessibility relation is linear but that would 
follow only if worlds are individuated extensionally by their domains (which is plausible if, as in (Linnebo 2013), the 
existence of urelements is not assumed). Linearity can be forced axiomatically by any of a variety of axioms; see 
(Chellas, 1980). The system resulting from adding a linearity axiom to S4 in place of G is S4.3 though, as Parsons 
notes (1983, pp. 319-20), S4.3 seems to add nothing over S4.2 for the purpose of deriving set-theoretic consequences. 
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 To derive the possible existence of all the Zermelo numbers thus requires a further principle 
asserting, roughly, that whatever is true of the potential hierarchy as a whole, as expressed in the 
potentialist translation 𝜑◇ of some proposition 𝜑 of set theory (hence a proposition containing no 
plural quantifiers35), is possible simpliciter: 
Ref 𝜑◇ → ◇𝜑. 
Thus, in particular, 𝐄𝐒◇ and 𝐏𝐫◇ yield a proposition 𝜑◇ expressing the infinite series of 
possibilities involving larger and larger initial finite segments of the Zermelo numbers.36 By Ref 
that series is reflected in a single possibility containing all — hence, by PC, the entire infinite 
plurality of — the Zermelo numbers, and so by Parsons’ Principle C it is possible that they 
constitute a single infinite set. 𝐈𝐧𝐟◇ follows immediately by some simple modal logic.37 The 
potentialist translation 𝐑𝐞𝐩◇ of the Replacement schema can be similarly proved by strengthening 
Ref to RefO  ◇∀𝒙(𝜑◇(𝒙) → 𝜑(𝒙)).38 
Importantly, it can be shown that the modalized quantifiers ◇∃ and □∀ “behave proof-
theoretically very much like ordinary quantifiers” (Linnebo, 2013, p. 213), thus explaining why 
they are not found in ordinary set-theoretic practice — mathematicians can, in effect, talk about 
the potentialist hierarchy as if it were actual. 
Concluding Philosophical Postscript. This article has focused chiefly on the technical 
development of modal set theory and its intuitive motivations without any close critical attention 
paid to surrounding philosophical questions. In closing we note briefly that a problem parallel to 
the completion problem threatens to arise for the potentialist. To see this, first, instead of restricting 
ourselves, relative to any given possible world, only to those possibilities that represent growth of 
the set theoretic universe, as we do in characterizing the potentialist hierarchy, let us broaden our 
 
35 Allowing plural quantifiers in 𝜑 without restriction would in fact lead to Russell’s Paradox. 
36 Specifically, 𝜑◇ is ◇∃𝑎∀𝑥𝑥 ∉ 𝑎 ∧ □∀𝑥◇∃𝑦□∀𝑧(𝑧 ∈ 𝑦 ↔ 𝑧 = 𝑥) and hence ◇𝜑 is ◇(∃𝑎∀𝑥 𝑥 ∉ 𝑎 ∧ ∀𝑥∃𝑦∀𝑧(𝑧 ∈𝑦 ↔ 𝑧 = 𝑥)). 
37 See (Wigglesworth, 2018) for an account that, unlike those of Parsons, Linnebo, and Studd, doesn’t require any sort 
of reflection principle to prove the possibility of an infinite set. 
38 Again, where 𝜑 contains no plural quantifiers. Parsons (1983, p. 323) relies on a rather different principle to derive Inf◇ and Rep◇. See (Linnebo 2013), p. 223, fn 28 for important further discussion. 
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metaphysical perspective to one where we are considering all possibilities on a par. From this 
standpoint, we see that, on the potentialist conception, at least the vast majority of pure sets are 
metaphysically contingent beings — in particular, for any given possible world 𝑤, those pure sets 
in any accessible world 𝑤′ whose members are mere pluralities in 𝑤. If this is in fact the sober 
truth about the metaphysics of sets, then set existence is metaphysically capricious — two possible 
worlds can be in all respects identical but for the fact that there are pure sets in one that simply and 
inexplicably fail to exist in the other. Though not identical to the completion problem, the 
apparently inexplicable contingency of set existence on the potentialist conception, taken literally, 
seems to raise questions parallel to those arising from the apparently inexplicably nonexistence of 
certain sets, as noted in the completion problem. 
 Perhaps in response to this difficulty — though neither explicitly says so — both Parsons 
(1977, §IV) and Linnebo (2013, pp. 207-8) suggest that the modality of the potential hierarchy is 
more semantic than metaphysical: at any given time, one’s conception of the “height” of the set 
theoretic universe, hence the range of one’s quantifiers, is determined by one’s strongest large 
cardinal assumptions.39 Once convinced of the existence of a larger cardinal still, pluralities that 
had been (relative to the earlier conception) absolutely unbounded constitute sets under the 
stronger assumptions and the range of one’s quantifiers broadens accordingly. Thus Linnebo (p. 
208): 
A claim is possible, in this sense, if it can be made to hold by a permissible 
extension of the mathematical ontology; and it is necessary if it holds under any 
permissible such extension. Metaphysical modality would be unsuitable for our 
present purposes because pure sets are taken to exist of metaphysical necessity 
if at all.  
However, if after all (pure) sets exist as a matter of metaphysical necessity (so that, in particular, 
any pure sets that could have existed actually exist), as Linnebo appears to suggest here, then the 
completion problem threatens once again to rear its head with all its original force: why are there 
only the pure sets there actually are? If, necessarily, all pure sets exist of metaphysical necessity, 
 
39 See also (Fine, 2006). 
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what explains the fact that there couldn’t have been more, the fact that there are pluralities of things 
such that it is not even metaphysically possible that they constitute sets?40 
These and related metaphysical questions prompted by the potentialist conception of set point 
to a fertile area for exploration in the philosophical foundations modal set theory.  
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